Introduction
Over the past two decades there has been a revolution in the life sciences with extremely rapid advances in genomics, synthetic biology, biotechnology, neuroscience and the understanding of human behaviour. The speed of progress is staggering. For example, in 1999 a special meeting of the National Academies of Sciences and the Society of Neuroscience noted that '[t]he past decade had delivered more advances than all previous years of neuroscience research combined'. 1 Many of these developments have great potential to benefit humankind-in, for example, the production of more effective, safer medicines.
2 Concern has been raised, however, by a growing number of those in the scientific and medical communities regarding the 'dual-use' nature of certain advances with the consequent danger of the new technologies being misused for the development of a new range of chemical or biological weapons. Meselson has stated that ' [d] uring the century ahead, as our ability to modify fundamental life processes continues its rapid advance, we will be able not only to devise additional ways to destroy life, but also be able to manipulate it including the processes of cognition, development and inheritance '. 3 And he added: ' A world in which these capabilities are widely employed for hostile purposes would be a world in which the very nature of conflict had radically changed. Therein could lie unprecedented opportunities for violence, coercion, repression or subjugation.' 
CWC
Review Conference Paper, no. 1, University of Bradford, UK, p. 5.
As the ongoing revolution in the life sciences has proceeded, the boundary between chemistry and biology, and consequently the distinction between certain chemical and biological weapons, has become increasingly blurred. Rather than thinking of chemical and biological weapons threats as distinct, certain analysts including Aas, 5 Dando, 6 Davison 7 and Pearson 8 believe it is more useful to conceptualise them as lying along a continuous biochemical threat spectrum. This chapter will focus upon research and development of those midspectrum agents (pharmaceutical chemicals, bio-regulators and toxins featured in Table 18 .1) that some consider as having potential utility as incapacitating weapons (incapacitants). The chapter will employ a holistic arms control (HAC) approach to examine the potential dangers and proposed utility of such agents and explore the obligations and opportunities for the life-science community to ensure that such agents are not utilised for hostile purposes.
Incapacitants: A primer
Although certain states and multilateral organisations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) 9 have sought to characterise incapacitants, there is currently no internationally accepted definition for these chemical agents. Indeed certain leading international experts believe that such a technical definition is not possible. 10 Whilst recognising the contested nature of this discourse, as a provisional working description, they can be considered as substances whose chemical action on specific biochemical processes and physiological systems, especially those affecting the higher regulatory activity of the central nervous system, produce a disabling condition (for example, can cause incapacitation or disorientation, incoherence, hallucination, sedation or loss of consciousness) or, at higher concentrations, death.
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There is a wide variety of agents that could potentially be utilised as incapacitants including anaesthetic agents, skeletal muscle relaxants, opioid analgesics, anxiolytics, antipsychotics, antidepressants and sedative-hypnotic agents, 12 many of which are currently legitimately utilised by the medical or veterinary professions. 13 Table 18 .2 summarises the results of a literature study and analysis of biomedical research into a range of pharmaceutical agents, published in 2000, by the Applied Research Laboratory and the College of Medicine at Pennsylvania State University, to identify the range of drug classes that had potential utility as incapacitants. The study clearly illustrates and indeed actively explores the potential dual-use applications of drugs initially developed for medical purposes, noting that:
It is well known that for every one new compound successfully proceeding from the discovery phase through all phases of clinical trials and on to market, perhaps hundreds, if not thousands, of compounds are discarded or shelved by the pharmaceutical industry [for example, as a result of their side effects] … However, in the variety of situations in which non-lethal techniques are used there may be less need to be concerned with side-effects; indeed, perhaps a calmative may be designed that incorporates a less than desirable side-effect … as part of the drug profile. 14 Furthermore, the study recommends explicit collaboration in this area, stating that 'it may be appropriate to develop a working relationship with the pharmaceutical industry to better incorporate their knowledge and expertise in developing a non-lethal calmative technique'. 15 The ethical implications of such relationships are, however, not explored. 
Box 18.1 Contemporary Czech Republic research into incapacitating chemical agents
The Czech Republic has had a longstanding research program into incapacitants dating from at least 2000, part of which was funded by the military .
a In May 2005, at the Third European Symposium on Non-Lethal Weapons, Czech researchers delivered a paper b describing their investigations over several years, administering rhesus monkeys with various pharmacological cocktails in order to determine which combinations and doses resulted in 'fully reversible immobilization' . The paper also described how '[f]ully reversible analgesic sedation was … tested in man', utilising the triple combination of dexmedetomidine, midazolam and fentanyl given to patients undergoing surgery, and a second combination of dexmedetomidine, midazolam and ketamine, which was tested on 10 nurses . In a 2007 follow-up paper, Czech researchers described how they 'decided to test new combinations [of drugs] for suppression or complete abolition of aggressive behaviour' in macaque monkeys . d The researchers claim that 'the results can be used to pacify aggressive people during medical treatment (mental disease), terrorist attacks and during production of new pharmacological nonlethal weapons' . e In July 2010, Czech researchers published a paper describing their studies inducing immobilisation in orang-utans and chimpanzees utilising a naphthylmedetomidine-ketamine-hyaluronidase combination .
f Although the results of this research were presented in terms of facilitating the relocation and painless medical examination of the animals, such research may also potentially be applicable to incapacitant development . Czech researchers have also investigated a number of alternative means of agent delivery including via inhalation administration, which was initially tested on rats and then on human 'volunteers', g who were reported to have been children in hospital . Furthermore, as Pearson has noted, even such predictive modelling will potentially underestimate fatalities when an incapacitant is used in real-life situations where there is uncontrollable variability 'both in terms of exposure (uneven concentration and exposure time) and within the target population (age, size, gender, health status and individual susceptibility)'. 26 As a result of such considerations, the British Medical Association believes:
The agent whereby people could be incapacitated without risk of death in a tactical situation does not exist and is unlikely to in the foreseeable future. In such a situation, it is and will continue to be almost impossible to deliver the right agent to the right people in the right dose without exposing the wrong people, or delivering the wrong dose. 
Box 18.2 Use of Chemical Incapacitant by the Russian Federation
Concerns about incapacitants were heightened following the use of a presumed derivative of fentanyl by Russian security forces to free more than 800 hostages held by heavily armed Chechen separatists in the Dubrovka Theatre in Moscow, in October 2002.
a According to reports, 30 minutes after an incapacitant was pumped into the theatre, the building was stormed by Russian Spetsnaz special forces who killed all of the Chechen hostage takers, including those left unconscious from the incapacitant, in apparent contravention of international humanitarian law .
b Although the hostages were released, more than 120 died as a result of the direct effects of the agent used or of airway constriction due to their incapacitation . An undetermined, but large, additional number of hostages suffered long-term damage, or died prematurely in the years after the siege . Even if all technical barriers to the development of a truly 'nonlethal' incapacitant were overcome, there are a number of serious risks and damaging consequences that could follow from the development of such weapons. These include the following.
• Creeping legitimisation: Perry Robinson believes that attempts by certain states, particularly the United States, to legitimise the development and use of incapacitants threaten to erode the norm against the weaponisation of toxicity. 30 He believes that this 'creeping legitimisation' presents the greatest danger to the existing prohibitions on chemical and biological weapons and to the re-emergence of chemical and biological warfare.
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• Proliferation and legitimisation by states: Pearson has warned that efforts to develop incapacitating weapons 'may well gather steam as more nations become intrigued by them and, observing the efforts of Russia and the United States, become convinced not only that effective and acceptably "non-lethal" incapacitating agents can be found, but that their use will be legitimized'.
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• Proliferation to, and misuse by, non-state actors: Analysts have highlighted the potential utility of incapacitants to a range of non-state actors including criminals, terrorists, paramilitary organisations and armed factions in failing or failed states many of whom would not feel as constrained as states by international law and concerns about lethality.
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• Use as a lethal force multiplier: There are concerns that incapacitants will be used by both military and law-enforcement agencies, not as an alternative • Confusion between lethal and 'nonlethal' chemical weapons: A state using a 'nonlethal' incapacitant during an armed conflict may be perceived by another party as having used a lethal chemical weapon and thus initiate an escalating cycle of retaliation leading to actual use of lethal chemical agents.
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Advances in science and technology
In the light of the previous research that has been conducted by certain states into incapacitants, the potential application of the current advances in the life sciences, particularly genomics, biotechnology, synthetic biology and neuroscience, 38 to incapacitating weapons development is a cause for concern. Trapp has highlighted the potential implications of the misuse of such research:
The explosion of knowledge in neuroscience, bioregulators, receptor research, systems biology and related disciplines is likely to lead to the discovery, amongst others, of new physiologically-active compounds that can selectively interfere with certain regulatory functions in the brain or other organs, and presumably even modulate human behavior Wheelis and Dando had previously surveyed developments and future trends in neurobiology and concluded that there were indications that military interest was already directed towards the next generation of substances affecting the brain and central nervous system:
In addition to drugs causing calming or unconsciousness, compounds on the horizon with potential as military agents include noradrenaline antagonists such as propranolol to cause selective memory loss, cholecystokinin B agonists to cause panic attacks, and substance P agonists to induce depression. The question thus is not so much when these capabilities will arise-because arise they certainly will-but what purposes will those with such capabilities pursue. Recent years have seen a rapid advance in the discovery of new bioregulators, especially of the incapacitating ones, in the understanding of their mode of action and synthetic routes for manufacture. Some of these compounds may be many hundreds of times more potent than the traditional chemical warfare agents. Some very important characteristics of new bioregulators that would offer significant military advantages are novel sites of toxic action; rapid and specific effects; penetration of protective filters and equipment, and militarily effective physical incapacitation. 41 Advances in discovery or synthetic production of potential incapacitating agents have occurred in parallel with developments in particle engineering and nanotechnology that could allow the delivery of biologically active chemicals to specific target organs or receptors. The implications of this were highlighted unparalleled access to the brain. Nanotechnologies can also exploit existing transport mechanisms to transmit substances into the brain in analogy with the Trojan horse.' 43 The report also highlighted the potential threats resulting from developments in nanotechnologies or gas-phase techniques that allow dispersal of highly potent chemicals over wide areas. It noted that at present 'pharmacological agents are not used as weapons of mass effect, because their large-scale deployment is impractical' as it is 'currently impossible to get an effective dose to a combatant'. The report states, however, that 'technologies that could be available in the next 20 years would allow dispersal of agents in delivery vehicles that would be analogous to a pharmacological cluster bomb or a land mine'. 44 Despite the interest in the development of incapacitants by certain states, and the ongoing advances in relevant science and technology with dual-use application, the international governmental and scientific communities currently seem unwilling or unable to establish and implement effective regulatory controls in this area.
The following sections of this chapter seek to apply a holistic arms-control approach to this issue in order to explore potential routes for effective regulation of such agents.
Applying a holistic arms-control approach to the regulation of incapacitants
For many years the governmental and non-governmental arms-control communities have sought to develop strategies to combat the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons to state and non-state actors. Recognising that reliance upon a single disarmament or arms-control agreement alone would not guarantee success, scholars have explored a number of concepts seeking to broaden the range of possible regulatory mechanisms. Utilising and building upon such work, particularly the concepts of preventative arms control 45 and webs of prevention (or protection), 46 the author has sought to develop a 'holistic arms control' (HAC) framework for regulation. Although the proposed HAC analytical framework concentrates upon existing arms-control • engagement by civil society • conducting societal monitoring and verification • developing a 'culture of responsibility' amongst the scientific and medical communities built upon strong normative and ethical standards • developing and advocating mechanisms to strengthen the regime. Whilst certain authors have previously examined the application of a range of state-led mechanisms for the regulation of incapacitants, 48 the importance of the life-science community's engagement in this issue has been underexplored. In the following sections, the author will, therefore, briefly examine the potential application of the two most pertinent arms-control regimes-the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Conventionbefore concentrating upon the potential roles that civil society, and particularly 48 the scientific and medical communities, can play in preventing the misuse of biomedical research for hostile purposes, most notably, the development of incapacitating weapons.
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
Article I of the BTWC declares that:
Each State Party to the Convention undertakes never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain:
1. Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins, whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes.
2. Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict. 49 Article I, together with the extended understandings agreed at successive BTWC review conferences, 50 makes it clear that the convention is comprehensive in its scope and that all naturally or artificially created or altered microbial and other biological agents and toxins, as well as their components, regardless of their origin and method of production are covered. Because some possible candidate incapacitants, such as bio-regulators including neurotransmitters, could be considered biological agents or toxins, a range of such incapacitants would be covered by the BTWC.
Although the BTWC does appear to cover certain incapacitants, there are ambiguities regarding the nature and scope of such coverage. For example, although the use of incapacitants of a biological origin in armed conflict or for 'hostile purposes' would be banned, the delineation between prohibited 'hostile purposes' and permitted 'peaceful purposes' has not been fully established under the convention. Consequently, it is unclear how the use of incapacitants of biological origin for 'military operations other than war' (MOOTW), would be regulated by the BTWC. To date, there have been no determinations of these issues by the BTWC states parties. 51 Further important limitations on the value of the BTWC (and its control regime) as a tool to regulate incapacitants arise from its current lack of effective verification and compliance mechanisms, and also the absence of an international organisation that could coordinate such activities and facilitate implementation by states parties.
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Chemical Weapons Convention
Although certain states in their background scientific papers to the seventh BTWC Review Conference highlighted the potential dangers of the misuse of biologically active agents such as bio-regulators and peptides that could be used as incapacitants, currently discussions on the regulation of such weapons have largely concentrated on the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The CWC prohibits the development, production, stockpiling, transfer and use of chemical weapons. 53 In addition, it requires that all existing stocks of chemical weapons 54 and chemical weapons production facilities be destroyed. 55 The treaty is of unlimited duration and is designed to be far more comprehensive in scope and application than any prior international agreement on chemical weapons. It is overseen by its own treaty body, the Organisation for the Prevention of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), including a technical secretariat of more than 500 inspectors, scientists, legal experts and ancillary staff headed by the director-general, which carries out the daily work of monitoring, verifying and facilitating implementation of the convention.
Although the convention prohibits chemical weapons, it allows for the controlled peaceful use of toxic chemicals. Article II.2 of the convention defines a 'toxic chemical' as 'any chemical, regardless of its origin or method of production, which, through chemical action on life processes, can cause death, temporary 51 Analysis was undertaken of all relevant documents pertaining to this issue publicly available up to 10 September 2013. 52 Although there is no equivalent of an OPCW for the BTWC, the Sixth BTWC Review Conference decided to create and fund a (three-person) Implementation Support Unit (ISU) within the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) of the UN Office at Geneva. The ISU was launched in August 2007 and its mandate was renewed and extended by the Seventh BTWC Review Conference to run until 2016. The ISU provides administrative support to, and prepares documentation for, meetings agreed by the BTWC Review Conference. The ISU also facilitates communication among states parties, international organisations, and scientific and academic institutions, as well as NGOs. It also acts as a focal point for submission of information by and to states parties, and will support, as appropriate, the implementation by the states parties of the decisions and recommendations of the Sixth and Seventh BTWC Review Conferences. The ISU, however, has no authority to undertake verification or compliance activities. incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals'. 56 The convention therefore covers a wide range of chemicals within its scope of regulation including certain chemical agents that could be used as incapacitants.
To determine whether the use of a toxic chemical such as an incapacitant would be in conformity with the CWC, the intention or purpose for its use needs to be determined. Under Article II.1 of the convention, chemical weapons are defined as 'toxic chemicals or their precursors, except where intended for purposes not prohibited by the Convention, as long as the types and quantities are consistent with such purposes'. • Law enforcement including domestic riot control purposes.
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It is therefore clear that the use of toxic chemicals such as incapacitants for purposes not provided for in Article II.9 (for example, as a method of warfare) would be prohibited, as would development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention or transfer of these chemicals for such purposes (under Article I of the CWC).
There are, however, a number of ambiguities in the CWC and limitations in its current implementation that could seriously restrict its ability to effectively regulate incapacitants. Although the use of toxic chemicals is permitted for law enforcement 'as long as the types and quantities are consistent with such purposes ', 59 there is no definition of 'law enforcement' in the convention. Furthermore, no OPCW policymaking organ has made any interpretative statements elaborating the scope or nature of permitted law-enforcement activities or regarding which toxic chemicals (if any)-save riot-control agents-could be used for such purposes. Consequently, the extent to which incapacitants could be used (if at all) for activities such as counterterrorist operations is contested. 60 
Engagement by the medical and scientific communities
Given the evident ambiguities and limitations of the existing state-centric chemical and biological weapons control regimes, compounded by their inadequate implementation by certain states parties, a great responsibility lies upon the life-science community as a whole and individual researchers in particular to ensure that their activities do not contribute to the development of a new generation of chemical and biological weapons, including incapacitants. Furthermore, it can be argued that there is an obligation upon life scientists to move beyond such 'personal regulation' and to take a far more proactive role in monitoring and regulating incapacitating agent research and combating the potential misuse of such agents. This section will explore potential avenues for greater engagement and action through the application of societal verification as a complement to the existing official verification mechanisms, the development of a culture of responsibility amongst the scientific and medical communities, and finally explore the possible roles that scientists, academics and other civilsociety actors can play in informing and influencing the actions of states in this area.
Societal monitoring and verification
Although there is no agreed formal definition of societal monitoring and verification, Diseroth describes societal verification as connot[ing] the involvement of civil society in monitoring national compliance with, and overall implementation of, international treaties or agreements. One important element is citizens' reporting of violations or attempted violations of agreements by their own government or others in their own country … A more recent development is civil society monitoring of global compliance with international agreements. In contrast to official verification organisations employing professional experts, societal verification may involve the whole of society or groups within it.
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The establishment of a global societal monitoring and verification networkinvolving large numbers of civil society actors resident in all states party to relevant chemical or biological treaties who are able to monitor their state's implementation of treaty obligations-appears to be unlikely in the near to medium terms. As Rotblat acknowledges, '[e]ven if governments were persuaded to pass laws to make reporting legitimate', which itself would be a revolutionary development and counter to existing practice in arms control and disarmament policy and the practice of many states, 'this goes so much against traditional loyalties that it would require a considerable educational effort to induce people to act on it voluntary'. 63 Consequently, he believes that implementation of societal verification 'requires a change in certain attitudes of the general public, which may take time'.
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A more limited form of societal verification, however, can be envisaged, comprising a smaller number of activist researchers who have access to the relevant technical expertise and can, at the very least, undertake open-source monitoring and analysis, and potentially conduct field missions. Due to resource, personnel, political and security constraints, such groups are likely to be limited 62 in terms of the countries from which they can operate and consequently the quantity and quality of information they are able to receive, particularly from inaccessible regions and closed or semi-closed authoritarian countries.
Open-source monitoring and analysis
A small number of academic and non-governmental organisations 65 have undertaken monitoring of open-source data, often utilising a range of national oversight and transparency mechanisms, to obtain information relating to the research, development and utilisation of incapacitants.
66 Such open-source monitoring and analysis are time-consuming, resource intensive and the information obtained is often limited as a result of national security restrictions, commercial confidentiality considerations and limited access to research published in certain countries. In addition, there is much inaccurate or biased reporting disseminated by both proponents and opponents of such weapons.
Despite the methodological difficulties and the limitations in the information obtained, such work is vital to the formation of an informed public discourse on the existing threats and potential dangers of the proliferation and misuse of these weapons. In addition it can also help in the development of timely and realistic publicly available threat assessments relating to R&D, deployment or utilisation of such weapons in specific countries. Furthermore, information derived from civil society research can be sent to relevant intergovernmental organisations, most notably the OPCW.
Field missions and witness testimony
Independent scientists, health professionals and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) can sometimes collect their own information, first hand, from onsite investigations or may be able to utilise information (for example, witness testimony) and analyse materials (for example, weapons shells, clothing fragments, soil samples) obtained from other civil society actors operating in the field (for example, journalists, national NGOs). There are several potential constraints upon such investigations including access, logistics and translation; safety considerations for researchers and witnesses; and difficulties ensuring chain of custody, as well as establishing the representativeness of the information obtained. Despite such constraints, material collected during field missions can provide information that could not be obtained by any other means-for example, allowing identification of toxic chemical agents utilised during a military or law-enforcement operation.
Box 18.4 Independent Analysis of a New Riot-Control Agent Used in the West Bank
In July 2005, the Israeli Army reportedly employed a new riot-control agent against Palestinian and Israeli civilian protesters that resulted in severe skin injuries. The Israeli Army refused to identify the agent; however, scientists based in the United Kingdom obtained one of the munitions utilised, and following physical and chemical analyses, were able to identify the contents as capsaicin with an inert carrier and a dispersal agent .
a The results were found to correspond with the commercially available 'Pepperball Tactical Powder' . The paper noted that '[s]kin injuries of the severity described had not previously been reported with this agent, and would be difficult to manage for clinicians who were unaware of the nature of the agent' .
b As well as alerting clinicians to the nature and effects of chemical agents they may face in the future, such research can also help to identify possible international transfers of chemical agents and devices . The remaining sections of this chapter will explore the current range of initiatives being undertaken by those in the scientific and medical communities to nurture a culture of responsibility, beginning with the growing recognition of the dual-use dilemma and the consequent requirement for effective oversight of research. This will then be followed by a discussion of the potential utility of oaths, codes and pledges and the parallel processes of education and awarenessraising in building the appropriate norms of behaviour for the scientific and biomedical communities. The practical application of such principles by individual scientists through such practices as whistleblowing will be explored as well as the duty of individual scientists to inform the policies and practices of governments in this area.
Research oversight and the 'dual-use dilemma'
To date, much of the discourse amongst the life-science community concerning how best to combat the proliferation and misuse of chemical and biological weapons has concentrated on tackling the dual-use dilemma and has been framed in terms of regulating the actions of individual life scientists conducting 'academic' research projects and publishing 'academic' articles.
Highly influential in this discourse have been the 2003 Fink Report (Biotechnology Research in An Age of Terrorism)
70 and the 2006 Lemon Report (Globalisation, Biosecurity and the Future of the Life Sciences), both produced under the auspices of the National Research Council of the US National Academies. Both reports highlighted the importance of taking a comprehensive approach to analysing 'dual-use' research of potential concern. The Lemon Report recommended the adoption of 'a broadened awareness of threats beyond the classical "select agents" and other pathogenic organisms and toxins, so as to include, for example, approaches for disrupting host homeostatic and defense systems and for creating synthetic organisms'. 71 The broad threat spectrums enunciated by both reports, particularly that of the Lemon Committee, appear to capture incapacitants within their scope.
As a result of the concerns and recommendations outlined in the Fink and Lemon reports and the work of others, 72 a range of oversight structures and processes was established by governments, scientific bodies, academic institutions, funders and publishers to review potential dual-use research, assessing the risks and benefits of such research to determine whether they need to be modified or withdrawn.
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Analysing the application of oversight measures in practice, however, Rappert believes that 'such procedures rarely conclude that manuscripts, grant applications or experiment proposals should not be undertaken or restricted'. In 2009, van Aken and Hunger analysed the application of biosecurity policies agreed by a group of 32 influential science journals under which manuscripts could be modified or rejected where 'the potential harm of publication outweighs the potential societal benefits'. 74 Despite such policies having been established in 2003, van Aken and Hunger found that no manuscript has ever been rejected on security grounds. 75 Rappert believes the 'same could be said' of those funders who have established submission-oversight systems.
76 Furthermore, Rappert believes that 'even more notable with these review processes is the infrequency with which they have identified items "of concern" in the first place'. 77 Whilst information relating to the research controls of government departments (especially defence-related ones) is not readily available, Rappert believes that in relation to universities and other publicly funded agencies, 'it seems justifiable to conclude that-barring dramatic changes-oversight processes will identify little research as posing security concerns and will stop next to nothing'. dual-use disasters'. 80 Research conducted by the Sunshine Project from 2004 to 2007 indicated that many US organisations obliged to follow NIH guidelines did not do so. 81 A 2007 Sunshine Project survey discovered that 18 of the top-20 US biotechnology companies did not comply with existing voluntary NIH biotechnology guidelines. 82 Instead of a voluntary approach, Hammond stated that '[e]ffective federal management of dual-use risks requires making safety and security oversight truly mandatory and subject to the sobering light of public scrutiny'.
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As well as concerns about the implementation of such voluntary oversight systems in practice, a further concern relates to the limited range of issues being considered by such bodies. The discourse and much of the current activity appear to be concentrated upon preventing the diffusion of dual-use knowledge, skills and materials to various non-state actors with malign intent-principally, terrorist organisations. Insufficient attention has been given to utilising existing dual-use monitoring mechanisms or adopting additional processes to specifically combat the misuse of dual-use expertise in state programs, even though national CBW research and development programs arguably pose a greater danger to the CWC and BTWC than non-state actors.
Oaths, codes and pledges for the life-science community
One approach to building a culture of responsibility has been through the development of a range of non-binding ethical codes, codes of conduct and oaths or pledges. An early advocate of such activities was Joseph Rotblat, who declared in his 1995 Nobel acceptance speech that:
The time has come to formulate guidelines for the ethical conduct of scientists, perhaps in the form of a voluntary Hippocratic Oath … At a time when science plays such a powerful role in the life of society, when the destiny of the whole of mankind may hinge on the results of scientific research, it is incumbent on all scientists to be fully conscious of that role, and conduct themselves accordingly. I appeal to my fellow scientists to remember their responsibility to humanity. 84 The development of ethical codes of conduct became one of the priority areas during the BTWC inter-sessional process. Subsequently, initiatives supporting such codes have been undertaken by a wide range of scientific associations and organisations including the American Society of Microbiology, 85 the National Academy of Sciences, The Royal Society, 86 the International Centre for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology, the International Union of Biochemistry and Molecular Biology and the International Council for the Life Sciences. These activities have been complemented and stimulated by the ICRC as well as the work of individual scientists 87 and academics.
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Such codes may well help to sensitise life scientists to the dangers of dual-use research, and reinforce the importance of, and promulgate, ethical 'red lines' where the legal prohibitions or normative taboos are already clearly defined and widely accepted. The effectiveness of such an approach, to date, has, however, been questioned by a range of scholars including Corneliussen, Dando, Perry Robinson and Rappert. 89 One important limitation of the majority of such initiatives is that the resulting codes are aspirational and non-binding in nature with no clearly identified penalties elaborated for those individuals who breach the prohibitions, or mechanisms established to monitor and enforce such prohibitions.
Recognising the limitations of self-governance initiatives to effect change in this area, some have called for codes of conduct to become binding, with those breaching such codes facing sanction from their peers (or the state). For example, Rotblat, in a letter to a Pugwash Workshop on Science, Ethics and Society in 2004, stated his belief that:
[S]ome believe that the search for knowledge overrides all other considerations and that scientists should be entitled to ignore the ethical elements of their work … The harm to society that has resulted from such attitudes has brought science into disrepute, and action is needed to restore the proper image of science. The introduction of a 'hippocratic' oath is our example of such action, but it should perhaps be given more than a symbolic value. Perhaps the time has come for a Examination of the literature, however, reveals that no such binding codes of conduct prohibiting research, development or utilisation of incapacitating agents have been established by any national or international scientific organisation to date.
Furthermore, Rappert has noted that 'if codes are to go beyond reiterating platitudes about the abhorrence of using modern biology toward malign ends, then they are likely to confront major issues of controversy. For instance, codes could comment on the acceptability of disputed attempts to develop "non-lethal" incapacitating agents.' 91 Areas of dispute or controversy, such as incapacitants, are the ones, however, where such codes remain silent or at best provide ambiguous guidance. Similarly, as with dual-use research oversight, whilst numerous codes condemn and seek to prevent the involvement of scientists in the development of biological and chemical weapons by non-state actors, it is questionable whether enough energy has been devoted to targeting the involvement of life scientists in state-run weapons programs.
Corneliussen has asked why voluntary self-governance regimes-and codes of conduct in particular-are being given so much attention in policy discussions about preventing the misuse of biological research when they appear to have significant shortcomings in practice. Indeed, why have individual scientists become the target of the policy discussions when it is generally accepted within the disarmament community that the greatest risk of misuse is at the level of national biological weapons programmes … Preventing these state-level programmes in the future should therefore be a primary concern, rather than implementing codes of conduct for life scientists. 92 Corneliussen further contends that:
[T]he current sole focus on codes, and the extensive investment of resources that accompanies it, might well serve to detract from other more crucial regulatory measures that target not only individual scientists but also state programmes. Without this plurality of regulatory measures in place, codes of conduct are doomed to fail.
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More recently there have been some indications of an increasing awareness amongst certain life-science communities of the dangers of cooption into state programs and initiatives undertaken to address these dangers (see Box 18.5).
Box 18.5 A Pledge for Neuroscientists
In January 2010, Dr Curtis Bell, senior scientist emeritus at the Oregon Health and Science University, circulated a pledge intended to foster opposition amongst neuroscientists to the application of neuroscience to 'torture and other forms of coercive interrogation or manipulation that violate human rights and personhood' . a According to Bell, 'such applications could include drugs that cause excessive pain, anxiety, or trust, and manipulations such as brain stimulation or inactivation' .
b Furthermore, signatories would oppose the application of neuroscience to 'aggressive war … illegal under international law' . The pledge states that a 'government which engages in aggressive wars should not be provided with tools to engage more effectively in such wars . Neuroscience can and does provide such tools . Examples include … drugs which damage the effectiveness of soldiers on the other side .' c Under the pledge, neuroscientists commit to making themselves aware of the potential misuse of neuroscience for violations of 'basic human rights or international law such as torture and aggressive war' and commit to refusing to 'knowingly participate in the application of Neuroscience to violations of basic human rights or international law' .
d Bell acknowledges that '[s]igning this pledge will not stop aggressive wars or human rights violations, or even the use of neuroscience for these purposes'; however, he believes that 'by signing, neuroscientists will help make such applications less acceptable' . Despite the energy and resources expended upon the development and promotion of codes, however, Rappert's stark conclusion is that 'efforts to devise meaningful codes have largely floundered'. Rappert believes that '[i]n no small part, this has been due to the lack of prior awareness and attention by researchers as well as science organisations to the destructive applications of the life sciences. Before codes can help teach, education is needed.' 94 93 Ibid., p. 54. 94 Rappert, 2010, op. cit., p. 14.
Education and awareness-raising
In 2005, following a series of interactive seminar discussions held with life scientists at 15 UK universities, Dando and Rappert concluded there was little evidence that participants 'regarded bioterrorism or bioweapons as a substantial threat … considered that developments in the life sciences research contributed to biothreats … were aware of the current debates and concerns about dual-use research; or … were familiar with the BWC'. 95 In 2006, Rappert et al. presented a report to the Sixth BTWC Review Conference, which stated that 'despite the recent international attention given to the problem of the potential misuse of the life sciences', the initial UK findings were essentially replicated in later seminars in the United Kingdom and in Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, South Africa and the United States.
96 Subsequent experience by Dando and Rappert 'of carrying out seminars in 16 different countries with a few thousand life scientists in over 110 different departments has consolidated these findings'.
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In a 2009 Nature article, Dando highlighted the 'lack of engagement with this issue among life scientists', which he considered 'alarming', 98 specifically with regard to the consequent dangers of the misuse of scientific and technological advances for the development of incapacitant weapons. Dando and colleagues have identified the current lack of adequate biosecurity teaching as an important factor contributing to such low levels of awareness amongst life scientists. Following their review of the effectiveness of existing education and awarenessraising initiatives, Rappert et al. conclude:
In such circumstances it is quite unrealistic to expect that simply, for example, adding a lecture to a standard course in the life sciences will make a great deal of difference … in depth implementation of the BWC within States Parties requires a significant effort on education and outreach for such implementation to be effective. To achieve this, a simple declaration as at previous Review Conferences about the importance of education will be insufficient and States Parties will need to take concerted action to ensure increased educational provision and outreach. 99 Similarly, Whitby and Dando believe that 'correcting this deficiency in educationand awareness-levels of life scientists will be a massive task'. 100 It is one that will require action by a broad range of constituencies involved in life-science education including, governments, bodies responsible for the administration of standards in higher education, funders of life-science education, civil society groups and NGOs involved in the production of educational material, and teachers and trainers. 101 Whilst a number of albeit relatively small and isolated initiatives are now being undertaken to educate and raise awareness amongst life scientists regarding dual-use dilemmas and the potential dangers of research being misused for chemical or biological weapons development, 102 there do not appear to be any sustained activities designed to foster greater awareness and knowledge of such issues beyond the life-science community. Rappert has noted that '[s]cant efforts made prior to 2001 (and even since) by scientists to popularise how their work might aid the production of bioweapons indicate the historical pattern of not seeking to foster wider debate and awareness'.
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It is, however, worth considering whether and how those scientists, academics and educators concerned about incapacitants and who are currently conducting CBW education and awareness-raising activities can also engage with key civil society actors in areas such as human rights, humanitarian law and medical ethics who at present have limited or no knowledge of the dangers posed by the potential harnessing of advances in chemistry and the life sciences to hostile purposes. The education and engagement of such expert communities would enrich and inform the existing discourse concerning incapacitants and broaden the range of actors seeking effective restrictions of such weapons. In considering such issues it may be worth exploring the roles of civil society awareness-raising initiatives and public education in helping to build successful multidisciplinary coalitions dedicated to addressing complex issues such as the prohibition of antipersonnel landmines and cluster munitions, addressing climate change, and promoting the establishment of the International Criminal Court. 
Developing and applying ethical standards for health professionals
In addition to life scientists, the participation of physicians and other health professionals in previous state-run incapacitant weaponisation programs has been documented in a range of countries including the United Kingdom, the United States and South Africa. 104 More recently, a number of health professionals in certain countries have voiced support for medical involvement in the research and development of incapacitant weapons. Anaesthesiologists who were engaged in the Czech Republic's incapacitant weapons development program have highlighted counterterrorism considerations: 'many agents used in everyday practice in anaesthesiology can be employed as pharmacological non-lethal weapons. An anaesthetist familiar with the pharmacokinetics and pharmacodynamics of these agents is thus familiar with this use. As a result, he or she can play a role in combating terrorism.' 105 The necessity of medical participation for the viability of incapacitant research has been highlighted by Gross, who believes that chemical incapacitants are among a limited range of 'nonlethal' weapons that are in effect '"medicalized" in that they rely on advances in neuroscience, physiology, and pharmacology and on the active participation of physicians and other medical workers'. 106 In comparison with the life-science community, amongst certain sectors, at least, of the medical professional community, ethical discourse regarding the involvement in development and use of 'nonlethal' chemical weapons appears to be more advanced. There are a number of ethical codes and declarations that are potentially applicable and may well constrain the involvement of health professionals in this area. First, there is a range of declarations and regulations adopted by the World Medical Association (WMA) that guide health professionals in situations of conflict and unrest 107 and specifically prohibit their involvement in torture, ill treatment and other forms of human rights abuse. 108 The WMA has also sought to develop ethical guidelines prohibiting medical involvement in the development of chemical or biological weapons. 109 In addition, guidance has also been developed by certain national medical associations and other medical bodies 110 on the ethical considerations surrounding health professionals' involvement in specific weapons research or weapons development more generally. A number of such bodies have also established a range of mechanisms and structures to implement ethical standards including ethics boards that have the authority to suspend or disbar physicians from practising medicine in cases of extreme misconduct.
There are thus ethical frameworks and mechanisms in place that describe and regulate the duty of health professionals to abide by and promote aspects of human rights and international humanitarian law, and specifically prohibit engagement in acts such as torture or the development of biological and toxin weapons. Whilst these and other ethical standards-particularly those concerned with medical research involving human subjects 111 -can in theory be applied to the development and utilisation of incapacitants, this does not appear to have occurred in a consistent manner to date. There are no widely accepted guidelines specifically determining the permissibility or non-permissibility of physician involvement in the development, testing or utilisation of so-called 'nonlethal' weapons in general and incapacitants in particular. Indeed the issue appears, at present, to be both underexplored and contentious, with a spectrum of opinions held by health professionals and medical ethicists.
Amongst national medical associations, it is the British Medical Association (BMA) that has taken the lead in the development of ethical guidance for the health community on the issue of 'nonlethal' chemical weapons, and in particular incapacitants. In its 2007 publication Drugs As Weapons, which explored the implications of incapacitant research, development and use, 112 the BMA declared that:
[D]octors should not knowingly use their skills and knowledge for weapons' development for the same reasons that these ethical considerations oppose doctors' involvement in torture and the development of more effective methods of execution. In other words, the duty to avoid doing harm rises above, for instance, a duty to contribute to national security. 113 The report specifically recommends that national organisations that represent healthcare professionals should
[w]ork to promote the norms prohibiting the use of poisons, and therefore the BWC and the CWC. They should further promote understanding that the use of drugs as weapons would violate such norms … Advocate against the use of drugs as weapons and not be involved in the training of military or law enforcement personnel in the administration of drugs as weapons. 114 Despite the activities of the BMA, the issue does not appear to have been specifically addressed formally by the WMA during its general assembly or in any other public WMA policy body. 115 Given the importance of medical participation to research, development, testing and utilisation of incapacitant weapons, the development of clear guidance in this area is needed.
Harvard Sussex draft convention
The Harvard Sussex Project (HSP) has proposed an alternative approach to addressing individual responsibility and culpability in the development or misuse of chemical and biological weapons, through the development of criminal sanctions. Meselson and Robinson have argued that '[a]ny development, production, acquisition, or use of biological and chemical weapons is the result of decisions and actions of individual persons, whether they are government officials, commercial suppliers, weapons experts, or terrorists'. They contend, however, that the BTWC and CWC 'are directed primarily to the actions of states, and address the matter of individual responsibility to only a limited degree'. In order to address this failing, HSP has developed a Draft Convention to Prohibit Biological and Chemical Weapons under International Criminal Law. If enacted, the HSP draft convention would make it a crime under international law for any person knowingly: to develop, produce, acquire, retain, transfer or use biological or chemical weapons; to order, direct or knowingly render substantial assistance to those activities; or to threaten to use biological or chemical weapons. 117 Under the HSP draft convention, each state party would be required to 'establish jurisdiction with respect to such crimes according to established principles of judicial law', and where the state has jurisdiction and is satisfied that the facts warrant such action, 'to submit those cases to competent authorities for the purpose of extradition or prosecution'. Furthermore, with respect to the actual use of CBWs, each state party would be required to 'establish jurisdiction over all persons found on its territory regardless of their nationality or place of the offence'.
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The HSP draft convention is a civil society initiative that will require considerable state support for it to be adopted by the international governmental community. One potential route previously explored by the HSP is 'for a group of states to submit the proposed convention or a similar draft in the form of a resolution for consideration by the UN General Assembly [UNGA], seeking its referral to the UNGA Sixth (legal) Committee for negotiation of an agreed text'. 119 Robinson has stated that '[o]nce we are satisfied that the political environment is favourable, our plan is to convene an international conference that will bring together policy makers, jurists and exponents of the Draft Convention'.
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Nonparticipation/whistleblowing
Any serious attempt by state or non-state actors to develop new or indeed existing chemical or biological weapons, be they considered 'nonlethal' or otherwise, would require the involvement of an array of scientists, engineers, technicians and other ancillary workers. Whilst such staff are essential to the development, production, stockpiling, transfer and use of such weapons, they are also potentially capable of 'blowing the whistle' on such research and development programs through public denunciations, leaking information to journalists or by reporting concerns about potential or realised breaches of national regulations or violations of international treaties directly to the relevant national or international regulatory bodies.
In his Nobel acceptance speech, Rotblat stated that:
The purpose of some government or industrial research is sometimes concealed, and misleading information is presented to the public. It should be the duty of scientists to expose such malfeasance. 'Whistleblowing' should become part of the scientist's ethos. This may bring reprisals; a price to be paid for one's convictions. The price may be very heavy. 121 Deiseroth highlights the particular vulnerability of whistleblowers:
Compared with normal citizens, employees are in a special situation because they owe their employer a certain loyalty and, by law, are normally not allowed to disclose internal or confidential information. Whistle-blowers, therefore, need protection if they make a disclosure in good faith and on the basis of reliable evidence. 122 Similarly, Falter notes that 'it is neither realistic nor legitimate to put the full burden of whistle-blowing and potential retaliation on individual scientists and their moral sensibilities'. 123 Indeed, whilst it is the duty of individual scientists to make known their concerns about the misuse of scientific research for activities that breach ethical standards or international law, it is the responsibility of the scientific community as a whole to ensure that such whistleblowers are fully protected. This was recognised by the ICRC in their 2004 statement, which declared that '[t]hose working in life sciences who voice concern and take responsible action require and deserve political and professional support and protection', and the corresponding action point, which was to 'ensure that adequate mechanisms exist for voicing such concerns without fear of retribution'. 124 Although a number of states such as South Africa, 125 the United Kingdom 126 and the United States 127 have legislation relating to whistleblowing activities on their statute books, the effectiveness of such legislation and its enforcement are variable. 128 Furthermore, Martin, who has long experience of working with, and seeking to protect, whistleblowers in many different spheres, believes that 'the track record of whistle-blower protection measures-whistle-blower laws, hot-lines, ombudsmen and the like-is abysmal. In many cases, these formal processes give only an illusion of protection. Codes of ethics seem similarly impotent in the face of the problems.' 129 It is important that independent scientists, health professionals and professional bodies-in cooperation with human rights, civil liberties and whistleblowing organisations-promote the establishment of truly effective mechanisms under international and domestic law that provide legal protection against discrimination and criminal prosecution for whistleblowers. Furthermore, given the failings of the current systems of whistleblower protection, the life-science and biomedical communities have a duty to support those individuals who refuse to participate in what they consider immoral research and development projects, and those who blow the whistle on such activities. A number of scientific associations and professional bodies have mechanisms for promoting ethical standards amongst their members, which can also be utilised to support colleagues facing reprisals for acting ethically.
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Conclusion
In its public statement 'Preventing hostile use of the life sciences, from ethics and law to best practice', the ICRC has noted that '[a]dvances in the life sciences hold great promise for humanity', but that 'there is also great risk if these same advances are put to hostile use'. 131 Whether the life sciences will be employed for the further development and proliferation of incapacitant weapons with the consequent dangers of the misuse of such weapons for internal repression or offensive military operations will depend to a significant degree on the actions of individual scientists and biomedical researchers and on the role of the life-science community as a whole. At a minimum this must entail stringent personal and community reflection and regulation of the trajectories and possible applications of relevant research to ensure it cannot be used for hostile purposes. In addition, it can be argued that now is the time for the lifescience community to take a far more active and engaged stance on this issue and join with the arms control, disarmament, human rights and humanitarian law communities to explore the full range of voluntary, normative and legally binding mechanisms that can be applied to protect humanity from the potential of abuse of the relevant technologies they are developing, whilst preserving the beneficial applications.
